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of the Quasi-Jury System (Saiban-In Seido) on the
Death Penalty in Japan
Leah Ambler*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The Japanese people will soon decide the fate of criminal defendants for the first
time in over 50 years. 1 Under the Lay Assessor Act as of May 2009, randomly selected
members of the Japanese public 2 will preside over criminal trials alongside professional
judges and be responsible for determining both verdicts and sentences. 3 Japan’s retention
of the death penalty means that members of the public will ultimately have to decide
whether a person lives or dies. 4
This article examines the potential impact of the new lay assessor system, or
saiban-in seido, on capital punishment in Japan, and considers whether it may reduce
death sentences to the point of effectively abolishing them at trial stage in the District
Court. The article posits that the introduction of the lay assessor system may create the
momentum for Japan to align its criminal justice system with that of other developed
countries—that is, abolition of the death penalty as an available criminal sanction. 5
I approach questions about the lay assessor system and abolition of the death
penalty from a normative perspective linked to current trends in international law and
human rights law. 6 Accordingly, this article argues that abolition of the death penalty—
de facto or de jure—is the most desirable outcome of the introduction of lay participation
in Japan. It explores the possibilities of a shift in the public conscience from passively
*

I would like to thank Professor Kent Anderson for his guidance, patience and support. Thanks also to
Japanese prosecutors, defense lawyers and abolitionists who provided views on the new system and to
family and friends for their encouragement. Please note that this article reflects the author’s personal views
and not those of the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, or the Australian
Government. This paper is dedicated to Kazutoshi Takahashi whose death sentence was confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Japan, 28 March 2006.
1
See Kent Anderson & Mark Nolan, Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: A Few Preliminary
Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from Domestic Historical and International
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 935, 937 (2004) (noting that Japan had a jury
system between 1923 and 1943).
2
Id. at 954; Saiban-in no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru horitsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay
Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004, art. 13 [hereinafter Lay Assessor Act], translated in 6
A SIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 243 (2005) (noting lay assessors must be selected from Japanese citizens
who are eligible to vote); Koshoku senkyo ho [Public Election Act], Law No. 100 of 1950, art. 9
(providing requirements for eligibility to vote).
3
Id. at art 6, translated in 6 A SIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 233, 240-41 (2005).
4
See Keiho [Penal Code], Law No. 45 of 1907, art. 9 (listing the available criminal penalties, namely
death, imprisonment with hard labour, imprisonment, fine, detention or fine with added forfeiture).
5
See W ILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE A BOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (3d
ed. 2002).
6
See, e.g., id.; ROBERT BADINTER ET AL ., DEATH PENALTY – BEYOND A BOLITION (2004).
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pro-capital punishment to abolitionist through active participation in the judicial system.
It is without doubt that any outcomes will depend upon the roles played by each of the
parties involved in the criminal justice system: the ministry of justice, judiciary,
prosecutor’s office, defendant and defens e lawyers. This article will examine the
development and possible impact of these roles through an analysis of the vested interests
of each of the parties, from the staunchly pro-capital punishment to the violently
opposed, and perhaps most importantly, to the fence-sitters.
Part One of this article describes developing international norms that are moving
towards de jure abolition of the death penalty under all circumstances. Part Two
describes the current capital punishment system in Japan—from arrest to execution—and
the reasons used to justify its retention. Part Three explores Japan’s twenty- year jury
system in the pre-World War II period in light of the future role of lay assessors in
deciding verdicts and sentences. Part Four considers how the lay assessor system may
impact Japan’s current attitude towards the death penalty and may even lead to a
suspension of death sentences or de facto abolition. In assessing its impact, the article
analyses the vested interests of each party involved. It concludes that the introduction of
the saiban-in seido may prove a vital first step towards eventual de facto abolition of the
death penalty in Japan, provided each party abides by rules of fairness and justice.
II. ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Background

¶5

Since the end of the Second World War, the international stance on capital
punishment has shifted from retentionist to abolitionist—more than half the countries in
the world have instated either de facto or de jure abolition of the death penalty. As of
December 2001, only seventy-one countries and territories had retained the death
penalty. 7 Of these, thirty-four had de facto abolition, that is, no executions were carried
out in the previous decade. 8 Currently seventy- five countries and territories are de jure
abolitionist and fourteen are de jure abolitionist for all but exceptional crimes, such as
war crimes. 9 The overwhelming trend towards de facto and de jure abolition in state
practice, along with a growing body of international and regional instruments urging
abolition, suggest that abolition of the death penalty is on the way to becoming a
customary rule of international law. 10
B. Abolition in International Instruments

¶6

Modern developments in international law and capital punishment began with the
proclamation of the right to life in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 11
This right encompasses the right to protection of one’s life from arbitrary deprivation by
7

ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A W ORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE app. 1, table A1.1 (3d ed. 2002)
Id. at app. 1, table A1.2.
9
Id. app. 1, tbls. A1.3, A1.4.
10
See, e.g., William A. Schabas, International Law and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT :
STRATEGIES FOR A BOLITION 36 (Peter Hodgkinson & William A. Schabas eds., 2004); SCHABAS, supra
note 5; BADINTER ET AL ., supra note 6.
11
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
8
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the State. 12 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 13 further
espoused the right to life 14 and specifically referred to the death penalty and its
abolition. 15 The ICCPR also established a prohibition on cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment and torture. In addition, it codified the doctrine of due process, the
presumption of innocence and the right to review. 16 However, it did not impose any
specific obligation to abolish or suspend capital punishment upon the ratifying States. 17
Several scholars have argued that by separating the death penalty from the right to
life, provisions of the ICCPR render the former an exception to the latter. However, the
adoption in July 1991 of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty casts doubt on the
validity of such arguments. 18 The Second Optional Protocol came after a raft of UN
Resolutions on abolition, 19 and although Japan opposed the Draft Protocol, it voted in
favor of the resolution that mandated its drafting. 20
C. Abolition in Regional Organizations

¶8

Even before the Second Optional Protocol entered into force, regional
developments towards abolition began with the 1985 Council of Europe Protocol No. 6 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 21 Subsequently in 1991, the Organization
of American States adopted the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
to Abolish the Death Penalty. 22 Most recently and perhaps most controversially on May
3, 2002, the Council of Europe opened for signature a further Protocol No. 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances. 23 Signed by all member states
except Azerbaijan and Russia and ratified by all but seven states, 24 Protocol No. 13
12

For approaches considered by the drafters, see SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 24.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), [hereinafter ICCPR].
14
Id. at art. 6(1).
15
Id. at arts. 6(2), 6(4)-(6).
16
Id. at arts. 7, 14.
17
Japan ratified the ICCPR on September 21, 1979. See e.g., Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights
Treaties as of 09 June 2004, 6, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
18
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the
abolition of the death penalty, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, G.A. res. 44/128, annex, 44, U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (entered into force July 11, 1991).
19
SCHABAS, supra note 5, at 156-167.
20
See id. at 176 (Japan (UN Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.32, para. 44, UN Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.53, para. 4, UN Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.67, para. 84)).
21
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
22
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 73, 29 I.L.M. 1447.
23
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning
the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, May 3, 2002, Europe. T.S. No. 187.
24
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Spain. See Council of Europe Treaty Office, Protocol
No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances CETS No. 187 - Status as of: Nov. 9, 2007,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=187&CM=&DF=&CL= ENG.
13

3

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

permits neither reservations nor derogations and calls for outright abolition of the death
penalty in all circumstances. 25 The strongly abolitionist Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe has passed recommendations and resolutions calling on Japan, as a
country with observer status, to institute a moratorium on executions and take the
necessary steps towards abolition of the death penalty. 26
D. Abolition in Asia
The death penalty is most widely used in Asia. Only Nepal, 27 Hong Kong, 28
Cambodia 29 and Timor Leste have established de jure abolition. 30 Other attempts at
abolition have met with little success. For example, after becoming the first country in
Asia to abolish the death penalty in 1987, the Philippines reintroduced it in 1994. 31 The
prospect for eventual de jure abolition exists in many countries which maintain de facto
abolition of the death penalty, including Laos (no executions since 1993), Myanmar
(1989), Brunei Darussalam (1957) and Bhutan (1964). 32 The abolition debate is also
gaining traction in Taiwan and South Korea. 33
¶10
On May 17, 1998, the Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission pushed
for abolition at the regional level by drafting and declaring Article 3.7 of the Asian
Charter on Human Rights. 34 Article 3.7 specifically calls for the abolition of the death
penalty in all states and sets out minimum standards to be complied with in countries
¶9

25

See Peter Hodgkinson, Capital Punishment: improve it or remove it?, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT :
STRATEGIES FOR A BOLITION, supra note 10, at 21-22.
26
Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, EUR. PARL . A SS. 17th Sitting, Res.
1253 (June 25, 2001), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/eres1253.htm#_ftn1 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); EUR.
PARL . A SS., 17th Sitting, Rec. 1522 (June 25, 2001), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assemb ly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA01/EREC1522.
htm; EUR. PARL . A SS., 30th Sitting, Res. 1349 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/ERES1349.ht
m; Eur. Parl. Ass., 30th Sitting, Rec. 1627 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta03/EREC1627.ht
m.
27
See HOOD, supra note 7, at 43 (Nepal abolished capital punishment in 1990 through insertion of Article
12 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal).
28
Id. (Hong Kong abolished capital punishment in 1993 while under British administration and maintains it
abolished under the ‘one nation two systems’ form of government under China).
29
Id. (Cambodia abolished capital punishment in 1993 through insertion of Article 32 of the Constitution).
30
Id. (East Timor abolished capital punishment on declaring independence from Indonesia in December
2001).
31
Law Reimposing the Death Penalty for Heinous Crimes, Republic Act 7659 (1994). Hodgkinson, supra
note 25, at 25; HOOD, supra note 7, at 44.
32
Id. at 45.
33
Hodgkinson, supra note 25, at 26. In particular, a Special Bill on Abolishing the Death Penalty was
introduced to the seventeenth South Korean National Assembly in February 2005; however, the legislation
is still under consideration. See Submission of the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties to the Joint
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade: Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with
Korea (Oct. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/south%20korea%20and%20death%20penalty.pdf .
34
Asian Human Rights Commission, Asian Human Rights Charter, art. 3.7, May 17, 1988, available at
http://material.ahrchk.net/charter/pdf/charter-final.pdf.
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where it still exists. 35 The Charter is an unofficial document that was used initially as a
lobbying tool to urge countries in the Asian region to protect fundamental human rights. 36
III. THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN
¶11

Against this international backdrop of declining use, Japan is an outlier in retaining
the death penalty. It has continuously maintained an active system of capital punishment
excepting two periods of de facto abolition. 37 Japan suspended death sentences for three
and a half centuries during the Heian period from 818 A.D until 1156, 38 and for three
years from November 1989 until March 1993. 39
¶12
This section describes current legal authority, procedures and practices for the
death penalty in Japan. It then examines the varying justifications made by Ministers of
Justice and the Public Prosecutors Office, along with references to public opinion polls,
which serve to promote Japan’s retentionist policy.
A. Capital Offences, Charges and Sentencing
¶13

Article 9 of the Penal Code lists the death penalty as one of six possible criminal
punishments. 40 Eighteen crimes are punishable by death under the Penal Code and other
special laws. 41 In practice though, death sentences have been limited to convictions of
murder, robbery- murder and rape- murder. 42
¶14
Despite the availability of the death penalty, prosecutors and judges lack guidelines
for determining when to seek and impose it. 43 One formula for prosecutorial charges and
judicial sentencing that was developed by a Japanese defense lawyer provides: 44

35

Id.
Seth R. Harris, Asian Human Rights: Forming a Regional Covenant, 1 A SIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J., at 4
(2000). Japanese groups and individuals —such as the Catholic Human Rights Committee, the International
Human Rights Centre, the Japan Union of Civil Liberty, and academics from Sophia University Institute of
International Relations and Kanagawa University—participated in the drafting of the charter.
37
See PETRA SCHMIDT , CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN JAPAN 9-31 (2002).
38
Except for two occasions. See Daniel Foote, “The Door that Never Opens”?: Capital Punishment and
Post-Conviction Review of Death Sentences in the United States and Japan, 19 BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 367,
376 (1993); SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 11-12.
39
Foote, supra note 38. at 376.
40
Penal Code, supra note 4, at art. 9.
41
Id., at art. 77(1) (Insurrection); art. 81 (Instigation of Foreign Aggression); art. 82 (Assistance to the
Enemy); 108 (Arson of Inhabited Buildings); art. 117 (Detonating by Explosives); art. 119 (Damage to
Inhabited Buildings by Flood); art. 126 (Overturning of Trains); art. 127 (Endangering Traffic by
Overturning a Train); art. 146 (Pollution of Water Supplies with Poisonous Materials and Causing Death
Thereby); art. 199 (Homicide); art. 240 (Robbery Causing Death or Injury); art. 241 (Rape at the Scene of
the Robbery; Causing Death Thereby); see also SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 30 (use of explosives; causing
death as a result of a duel; causing death as a result of an aeroplane crash; causing death by hijacking an
aircraft; killing a hostage); Yoshihiro Yasuda, The Death Penalty in Japan, in DEATH PENALTY, supra note
6, at 215, 217.
42
Foote, supra note 38, at 380.
43
Joachim Herrmann, The Death Penalty in Japan: An “Absurd” Punishment, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 830
(2002).
44
David T. Johnson, The Death Penalty in Japan: Secrecy, Silence and Salience, in THE CULTURAL LIVES
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT : COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 251, 262-63 (Christian Boulanger & Austin Sarat
eds., 2005).
36
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(i)

Single murders without prior convictions do not result in death charges or
convictions;
(ii) Double murders without prior convictions may result in a sentence of life
imprisonment instead of a death sentence; and
(iii) Triple murders will definitely result in a death charge and sentence. 45
¶15
Other criteria often used to impose the death penalty have been derived from the
1983 Supreme Court decision in the famous Nagayama trial46 and include the
circumstances of the crime, motive, number of victims and effect on society.
¶16
The new Lay Assessor Act contains nothing in the way of sentencing guidelines for
lay assessors or judges. Whether the yet-to-be-drafted Supreme Court Rules will provide
such guidance remains to be seen.
B. Appeals
¶17

Once sentenced to death at the trial stage in a District Court, a convicted person
may lodge a direct appeal to the High Court for review of the original judgement, and
subsequently to the Supreme Court on constitutional matters or precedential
consistency. 47 Once a second appeal fails and the sentence is confirmed, the convicted
person may seek retrial, pardon, amnesty or extraordinary appeal, all of which are granted
at the discretion of the Cabinet. 48 Such requests do not guarantee a stay of execution. 49
¶18
Although this article focuses on the effect of lay participation on the death penalty
at the trial phase, subsequent High Court and Supreme Court review of saiban-in
decisions will ultimately decide whether death sentences will continue to be handed
down.
C. Executions
¶19

Seven detention centers are equipped for executions, which are carried out by
hanging under Japanese law. 50 Executions must be carried out within six months of the
judgment becoming final51 and within five days of the issuance of an order by the
Minister of Justice. 52 However, the lengthy nature of appeals and applications for retrial
usually extends the period between confirmation of sentence and execution to fifteen to
twenty years. 53

45

Id.
Nagayama v. Japan, 37 Keishu 6, 609 (Sup. Ct., Jul. 8, 1983). See also SCHMIDT supra note 37, at 50.
47
Yasuda, supra note 41, at 220.
48
Nihonkoku Kenpo [Constitution of Japan], art. 73, para. 2 [hereinafter Kenpo] (“The Cabinet shall . . .
decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of
rights”); SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 123.
49
Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, 2004 Nenpo: Mujitsu no shikeiin tachi [2004 Annual Report: The Innocent
Condemned] 88 (2004) (Teruo Ono was executed 17 December 1999 with a pending request for retrial).
50
Keiji soshoho [Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 131 of 1949, art. 475.
51
Id. at art. 476.
52
Id. at art. 475.
53
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 196.
46
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Table 1. Death Sentences and Executions Since 1988 54
Year
District Court
Decisions
High Court
Decisions
Supreme
Court
Decisions
Newly
confirmed
sentences
Executions
Number of
people with
confirmed
sentences

88
10

89
2

90
2

91
3

92
1

93
4

94
8

95
11

96
1

97
3

98
7

99
8

00
14

01
10

02
18

03
13

04
14

4

5

2

4

4

1

4

4

3

2

7

4

6

16

4

17

15

7

5

7

4

4

5

2

3

4

4

5

4

3

4

2

0

13

11

5

6

5

5

7

3

3

3

4

7

4

6

5

3

2

15

2
38

1
40

0
46

0
51

0
56

7
56

2
57

6
54

6
51

4
51

6
52

5
50

3
53

2
56

2
57

1
56

2
68

D. Justification for Japan’s Retention of the Death Penalty
1. The Ministry of Justice
¶20

The Japanese Minister of Justice is responsible for signing execution orders (shikei
shikko meirei) and has ultimate control over the continuation of executions. I have
classified Japanese Ministers of Justice into three categories of approaches to signing
execution orders. The first is the “Sheriff”-- a Minister of Justice who exercises his
duties in the pursuit of social stability. For example, Minister Masaharu Gotoda justified
signing three execution warrants, which ended a forty- month moratorium from
November 1989 to March 1993 by stressing his obligation as Minister of Justice to
“protect law and order.”55
¶21
The second category consists of the “Servants,” or Ministers of Justice who
prioritize their official duties above any contrary personal beliefs. For instance, at current
Minister of Justice Seiken Sugiura’s first press conference upon taking office, he
announced that he would not sign an execution order for philosophical and religious
reasons. 56 The very next day, speaking in his official capacity, he retracted that
statement:
The statement I made at yesterday’s press conference in relation to
executions was an expression of my individual sentiments and not a
statement in relation to the performance of my role as Minister of Justice
and guardian of the law. In this respect I regret that there has been a
misunderstanding and seek to rectify it. 57

54

Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, supra note 49, at 141.
Johnson, supra note 44, at 257.
56
Minister of Justice Seiken Sugiura, Homu daijin hatsutochogo kisha kaiken no gaiyo [Overview of press
conference after the Minister of Justice first took up office] (Oct. 31, 2005).
57
Id. (Nov. 1, 2005).
55
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The final group are the “Samaritans,” those Ministers of Justice who refuse to sign
executions on principle. Minister Akama Bunzo was perhaps the first of these; he
reportedly refused to sign any execution orders presented to him during his term from
November 1967 until November 1968. 58 Other Samaritans include Ministers Hasegawa,
Kajiyama, Sato and Tahara who he ld office between November 1989 and March 1993. 59
During this period, not a single execution took place, effectively resulting in a fortymonth moratorium on executions.
2. The Judiciary and the Public Prosecutors Office

¶23

While Ministers of Justice play the decisive role in finalizing death sentences,
prosecutors initiate the process by deciding whether to seek the death penalty at the trial
stage and whether to continue to seek it on appeal. In turn, decisions by prosecutors to
seek death sentences place pressure on judges to grant them, as Japanese judges tend to
give weight to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 60 Due in large part to judges and
prosecutors sharing similar social and educational backgrounds, 61 judges rely heavily on
evidence of confessions extracted by prosecutors for convictions. 62 This reliance results
in a seemingly concerted effort between prosecutors and judges in criminal cases. A
further factor contributing to the judiciary’s pro-retentionist stance is its conservatism. 63
Trained and nurtured by the Ministry, the judiciary demonstrates a strong tendency to
defer to government policy. Death sentences prove no exception. 64 The greatest
imperative on judges to continue death sentencing is, however, a perception of public
pressure. High profile cases attract extensive media attention which arouses public
sentiment and creates a perceived obligation on the judiciary to give defendants in more
violent crimes the ultimate penalty. 65
3. Public Opinion Polls

¶24

The most frequently cited reason for continued sentencing and execution in Japan
is public support for capital punishment. The Japanese government has relied on public
opinion polls to respond to criticism and justify its stance both domestically and

58

SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 63.
Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, supra note 49, at 205.
60
See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE W AY OF JUSTICE : PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 62 (2002)
(Judges not only convict what prosecutors charge, but they also impose sentences which prosecutors seem
to like).
61
Id.
62
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 152.
63
There is general consensus among Japanese and foreign academics on the conservatism of the Japanese
judiciary. However, different reasons are identified. See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative control of
Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C. Lewis, ed.,
1994); J. Mark Ramseyer, Judicial (In)dependence in Japan, in UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL RECORD
1993-1995 at 4 (volume 39 Fall) (1993); John O. Haley, Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 Law
in Japan 1, 2, 8-18 (1995), in JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT : READINGS IN SOCIETY, THE ECONOMY AND
POLITICS 89 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., eds., 2001).
64
‘Courts,’ infra Part III. E(a).
65
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 122; see also, Mayumi Negishi and Kaho Shimizu, Young killers at the heart
of capital punishment fight, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 20, 2006,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20060520f2.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
59
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internationally. 66 Linking the will of the people to retention of capital punishment gives
such sentences a certain democratic legitimacy.
¶25
Public opinion polls regularly demonstrate widespread support for capital
punishment. In the most recent poll conducted in 2004 by the government, an
unprecedented 81.4% of people surveyed agreed with the statement that in certain
circumstances the death penalty is unavoidable. 67 Arguably, public opinion polls are
relatively more empirical and form a more rational and universal basis 68 for retention. 69
Table 2. Public opinion poll results concerning the death penalty in the last 50 years 70
Year
1953
1967
1975
1980
1989
1990
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1999
2003
2004

Implementing Agency
Prime Minister’s Office
Prime Minister’s Office
Prime Minister’s Office
Prime Minister’s Office
Prime Minister’s Office
Tokyo Newspaper
Asahi Television
Yomiuri Newspaper
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK)
Prime Minister’s Office
Forum 90
Prime Minister’s Office
Asahi Television
Cabinet Office

Retentionist
65.0%
70.5%
56.9%
62.3%
66.5%
53.0%
62.1%
63.9%
62.8%
73.8%
58.3%
79.3%
45.7%
81.4%

Abolitionist
18.0%
16.0%
20.7%
14.3%
15.7%
34.0%
20.6%
28.3%
17.2%
13.6%
22.2%
8.8%
32.0%
6.0%

¶26

Critics point out many deficiencies in the public opinion polls, including a lack of
cross-sectional quality in the audience surveyed; problematic phrasing of questions; and
the political motivations of the agency conducting the poll. 71 Nonetheless, overall
support for Japan’s system of capital punishment is undeniably high.
¶27
Judging from the normative perspective grounded in international law that the
death penalty should be abolished under all circumstances, one argument may be that the
Japanese public is wrong in its support of the death penalty. This article asserts instead
that the Japanese public is uninformed. Due to their relative ignorance about the system
of capital punishment in their own country, the Japanese are ill-equipped to make
judgments required in these opinion polls. This lack of information permeates every

66

See ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1996: Japan.
01/10/97, CCPR/C/115/Add.3 art. 6, para. 62 (Jan. 10, 1997) (‘under present conditions, the majority of the
Japanese people insist that capital punishment should be maintained to punish those who commit extremely
atrocious offences’), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9afe294abf7c3f628025663900556e44?Opendocument; see, e.g.,
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 61-62; NOEL W ILLIAMS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN JAPAN 44 (1997).
67
See Government Publications Office, Department of the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Kihonteki ho
seido ni kansuru yoronchosa [Public opinion poll in relation to the basic legal system] (Dec, 2004),
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-houseido/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
68
See SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 160.
69
Id. at 158.
70
Id. at 117.
71
Id. at 157-188.
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stage of the process—from interrogation of suspects 72 to post-trial detention73 to most
importantly, execution. 74
¶28
Up until now the direct impact of this judgment has been minimal. However, the
introduction of the lay assessor system in May 2009 will require the Japanese public to
determine whether to sentence individual defendants to death, not whether to retain or
abolish the death penalty as a system. Already future lay assessors have indicated that
they do not want to be involved in the system; in one public opinion poll, 46.5 percent of
those surveyed did not want to become lay assessors because they did not want to judge
people. Another 46.4 percent responded that they did not wish to participate because of
the difficulty in determining guilt or innocence. 75 For the first time, the new saiban-in
seido will educate and equip the public with the necessary tools to make an informed
decision about the future of capital punishment in Japan. While predictions about the
nature of this decision are difficult, a certain shift in the public’s stance on the death
penalty is foreseeable.
E. Abolition of the Death Penalty in Japan
¶29

Despite overwhelming support for retention of the death penalty in the judiciary,
legislature and general public, abolitionist groups do exist in each of these sectors. This
section applies an institutional analysis to attempts thus far as well as plans in the future
to abolish Japan’s system of capital punishment.
1. The Courts

¶30

To date, challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty have been few and
unsuccessful. By the end of the 1950s, the Supreme Court had ruled on almost all major
constitutional challenges to capital punishment and made no subsequent revisions
thereafter. 76
¶31
Perhaps the most unequivocal of judicial precedents on the death penalty is the
Japanese Supreme Court’s 1948 decision77 that considered whether capital punishment
contravenes the right to life 78 and the prohibition on cruel punishment. 79 The court found
72

A suspect may be detained and questioned for twenty-three days between arrest and indictment without
any form of mandatory recording of the interrogation process. See id., at 152.
73
Once a death sentence is confirmed, all communication with the outside world is severed, except brief,
supervised meetings with lawyers and close family. See, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 43; Yasuda, supra note
41.
74
Most executions take place when Parliament is not sitting and the practice of publishing the number and
date of executions has only been in place since November 1998. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 44, at 258;
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 75.
75
See Government Publications Office, Department of the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Saiban-in seido
ni kansuru yoron chôsa [Public opinion poll in relation to the Lay Assessor System] (Feb. 2005),
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-saiban/.
76
SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 100.
77
A v. Japan, 2 Keishu 3, 191 (Sup. Ct., 1948).
78
Constitution of Japan, art. 13, provides, “All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public
welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.” KENPO, supra note
48, at art. 13.
79
Id. at art. 36 (“The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely
forbidden”).
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that the Constitution protects an individual’s right to life only to the extent that that right
does not interfere with the public welfare. Therefore, in eliminating threats to the public
welfare, the death penalty trumped the right to life. 80 The Court also held that capital
punishment does not contravene the prohib ition of cruel punishment contained in article
36.81 Although the four judges in the minority allowed scope for reconsideration of this
doctrine in the event of a shift in public opinion against the death penalty, this remains
the definitive stance on the issue. 82
¶32
In the final constitutional challenge to capital punishment, Ichikawa et al v.
Japan,83 defense counsel argued that the current method of execution violates Article 31’s
requirement that criminal penalties be imposed according to procedure established by
law. Defense counsel claimed that the Act concerning the Validity of Provisions which
were in Force at the Time of Enactment of the Japanese Constitution84 rendered
ineffective Cabinet Order No. 65 of 20 February 1873, 85 which created the framework for
executions; hence, the death penalty was not being carried out according to procedure
established by law. The Court rejected this argument and with no further successful
challenges to capital punishment ’s constitutionality as of June 2006, has unequivocally
excluded a judicially-driven abolition of the death penalty.
¶33
Nevertheless, there are judges opposed to the death penalty, including former
Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan Shigemitsu Dando. 86 Yet even Dando spoke of
death sentencing as unavoidable during his term as Supreme Court Justice, 87 as
prosecutors continue to press for the death penalty where it remains a legal form of
punishment. 88 Accordingly, legislative change alone can remove this constraint, which
ultimately requires a shift in the official government stance.
2. The Legislature
¶34

The official position of the Japanese government is retentionist. Apart from an
unofficial three- year moratorium on the death penalty by virtue of individual Ministers of
Justice choosing not to sign execution orders, there has been at least one execution
annually. 89 Bills on abolition were presented to the Diet four times in 1901, 1902, 1906
and 1956. None of these bills passed.

80

See SCHMIDT , supra note 37, at 99.
Id. at 91.
82
Id.
83
Ichikawa et al v. Japan, 15 KEISHU 7, 1106 (Sup. Ct., July 19, 1961), translated in THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 161-164 (Hiroshi Itoh &
Lawrence Ward Beer eds., 1978).
84
Nihon koku kenpo shiko no sai ni gen ni koryoku wo yusuru meirei no kitei no koryokuto ni kansuru
horitsu [Act Concerning the Validity of Provisions which Were in Force at the Time of Enactment of the
Japanese Constitution], April 18, 1947.
85
Dajokan fukoku [A Revised Chart of Hanging Equipment], Cabinet Order No. 65 of 1873, available at
http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/help/ilabhelp.html#dajyoukan.
86
See Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 7 (1996).
87
See id. at 15.
88
See id. at 16.
89
Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, supra note 49, at 169 (“It is considered that abolition of the death penalty
would be inappropriate.” (quoting Chieko Nono, Item 9, Minutes of the Justice Committee, 161st Sess. of
the H. of Councillors (7 November 2004) (response of former Minister of Justice))).
81
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In 1994, however, several members of the Diet formed an all-party Diet Members’
League for the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Parliamentary Union for the Abolition of
the Death Penalty). 90 As of 2003 the League had 122 members, the equivalent of onesixth of the Diet. 91 In conjunction with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations
(JFBA), 92 in November 2004 the League drafted an Act for a Moratorium on Executions.
The League considered the passage of this Act to be the best first step towards abolition,
based on advice from Parliamentary Assembly members of the Council of Europe who
attended a Justice and Human Rights Seminar hosted by the Diet Members’ League on
May 17, 2002. 93 The subsequently established JFBA Committee on the Realization of a
Moratorium on Executions 94 produced the first draft of the Act, which also incorporated
the establishment of a House of Councillors Committee on the Death Penalty on May 17,
2005.95 As of June 2006, the Bill has yet to be presented to parliament. Nevertheless,
increased abolitionist activity at a governmental level suggests that if the momentum
continues, de jure abolition may be possible.
3. The People

Around two dozen abolitionist groups have established themselves in Japan, 96 the
largest of which is Forum 90. 97 Forum 90 was set up in 1990 as a collaboration among
Amnesty International’s Japan Section, private citizens, community organizations,
lawyers, politicians, academics, members of religious groups and convicted persons.
Originally established to support Japan’s ratification of the Second Optional Protocol,
Forum 90 now has over 5,000 members. It conducts seminars, holds interviews with the
Minister of Justice, and cooperates with abolitionist movements in Korea and the United
States. 98 Forum 90, along with other organizations such as Amnesty International and the
Japan Civil Liberties Union, has submitted NGO reports on the death penalty in Japan to
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 99
¶37
Despite gradually changing attitudes towards capital punishment in Japan, the
legislature, judiciary, administration and the populace continue to support the death
penalty. The following section examines Japan’s previous jury system, the new lay
assessor system, and their past and future impact on the death penalty in Japan.
¶36

90

Shikei haishi giin renmei.
Yasuda, supra note 41, at 229.
92
Nihon bengoshi rengokai (nichibenren).
93
See Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, supra note 49, at 184.
94
Nichibenren shikei shikko teishi jitsugen iinkai.
95
Shikei seido chosakai no secchi oyobi shikei shikko no teishi ni kansuru horitsu [Act Concerning the
Establishment of the Committee on the Death Penalty and a Moratorium on Executions], First Draft of the
Committee 17 May 2005.
96
See Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai (2004) Mujitsu no shiheishu-tachi. Tokyo Impakuto Press, 177-186 (for
a list of these groups).
97
Shikei haishi kokusai joyaku no hijun wo motomeru Forum 90.
98
Shikei Haishi Henshu Iinkai, supra note 49, at 179.
99
See, e.g., FORUM 90, A LTERNATE REPORT ON A RTICLE 6 OF THE ICCPR WITH REGARD TO THE FOURTH
PERIODIC REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (Sept. 1998); A MNESTY INT ’L, JAPAN : THE DEATH
PENALTY: SUMMARY OF CONCERNS, AI INDEX: ASA 22/01/97 (1997); INT ’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN: A PRACTICE UNWORTHY OF A DEMOCRACY, REPORT NO. 359/2, at 8-9
(2003), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/jp359a.pdf (citing JAPAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION , 1998 REPORT
CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN (Oct. 1998)).
91
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IV. LAY PARTICIPATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN

¶38

The concept of lay participation in the criminal justice system in Japan is not new.
For example, civil conciliation proceedings (chotei) involved lay persons during the
Tokugawa period, 100 in the pre-WWII jury system that lasted for twenty years 101 and in
prosecutorial review commissions (kensatsu shinsa kai). 102 This section briefly describes
the twenty-year jury system that was suspended in the midst of World War II and
examines its outcomes relative to the new lay assessor system and its role in potential
abolition of the death penalty. It then describes the new lay assessor system and its future
shape and influence as the greatest grant of judicial decision- making power to the
Japanese people to date.
A. The Japanese Jury (1923-1943)
1. Background

¶39

Japan’s pre-war jury system (baishin seido) was introduced by the 1923 Jury Act,
which, like the Lay Assessor Act, 104 imposed a five-year grace period before the Act
entered force. After taking effect in 1928, the jury system was then suspended in 1943. 105
The pre-war jury system was based on systems for lay participation in France, Germany,
England and the United States.
¶40
In the pre-war system, a jury presided over death or life imprisonment trials unless
the accused chose otherwise. 106 In all other cases, juries were only empanelled if
specifically requested by the defendant, 107 in which case the defendant had to bear the
costs of the jury. 108 Only Japanese males over the age of thirty who paid three yen or
more in taxes over the previous two years were eligible to serve as jurors. 109 Rather than
returning a verdict of guilty or not guilty, the jury deliberated and formulated responses
to questions of fact posed by the judge. 110 A simple majority of the twelve jurors 111
determined the responses, which were ultimately not binding on the outcome of the
case. 112 The Jury Act did not allow for objections to the judge’s jury instructions. 113
103

100

The Tokugawa period ran from 1603 to 1868. Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62
LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 261, 280 (1999); See also DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND
JAPANESE LAW : TOKUGAWA AND M ODERN, VOLUMES I AND II (1965).
101
See ‘The Japanese Jury’, infra Part IV. A.
102
See, e.g., Mark West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 695 & n.61 (1992).
103
Baishin ho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923 [hereinafter Jury Act].
104
Lay Assessor Act (Supp. 2004), art. 1, supra note 2, at 280.
105
Baishin ho no teishi ni kansuru horitsu [Act to Suspend the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of 1943.
106
Id. at art. 3.
107
Id.
108
Takashi Maruta, The Criminal Jury System in Imperial Japan and the Contemporary Argument for Its
Reintroduction, 72 INT ’L REV. PENAL L. 215, 216 (2001) (Fr.).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 217.
113
Jury Act, supra note 103, at art. 78.
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2. Death Sentences and the Japanese Jury
¶41

In contrast to jurors in the future Japanese saiban-in seido, pre-war jurors in Japan
did not have to decide directly whether to sentence a particular defendant to death.
Nevertheless, the experience of those jurors offers a glimpse into how jurors in the new
lay assessor system may act when called upon to sentence a criminal. Data collected
from Japan’s original jury system suggests that lay people are more lenient than
professional judges in criminal sentencing. Juries returned significantly more acquittals
than modern judge-only trials across the board and despite wartime mobilization and
other impediments. 114 For example, a study of the criminal courts in Sendai between
1928 and 1943 indicates a certain leniency in the overall jury decisions; of sixteen
defendants tried by juries, ten were acquitted and three were found guilty of a lesser
charge. 115 A second study found that juries acquitted sixty-three percent of murder
suspects and accused arsonists, while judges acquitted only .07% of persons accused of
those crimes during the same period. 116 Scholars argue that this dramatic difference in
outcomes resulted from jurors’ heavier reliance on physical evidence, replacing the
traditional judicial reliance on prosecutorial dossiers and written confessions in
convictions. 117 If the new lay assessors act similarly to their predecessors, this may allow
room for de facto abolition in the form of lesser sentences or acquittals and may even
create a momentum for de jure activism.
B. The New Lay Assessor System

¶42

While not the first form of lay participation in Japanese history, the saiban-in seido
is the first of its kind in Japan and the world. 118 A hybrid of the classic common law jury
system and the mixed courts of the civil system, this model for a new lay assessor system
significantly reconstructs criminal justice in Japan and thereby may change Japan’s
fundamental approach to capital punishment. This section highlights areas for potential
development and change through an analysis of articles in the Lay Assessor Act related to
the role of saiban-in in death sentencing.
1. Purpose

¶43

The Lay Assessor Act was enacted on May 28, 2004, as one of a suite of judicial
reforms proposed by the Justice System Reform Council (shiho seido kaikaku shingikai)
in its 2001 report. 119 The main goals of the saiban-in seido are to deliver better justice
and promote a more democratic society through citizen involvement in the judicial
process. 120 The explicit purpose of the Lay Assessor Act is “to contribute to the
114

See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 1, at 964.
Maruta, supra note 108, at 217.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
For a detailed background of the political lead-up to the drafting of the law, see generally Anderson &
Nolan, supra note 1.
119
See generally JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
REFORM COUNCIL—FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY, ch. IV, pt. 1(1), 8892 (June 12, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
120
Anderson & Nolan, supra note 1, at 941-44.
115
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promotion of the public’s understanding of the judicial system and thereby raise their
confidence in it.”121 From the outset, even before the Act was drafted, there was no
consideration of the protection of defendants' rights as a reason for reform. 122 Neither the
drafters nor the text itself envisage the introduction of the new system as a catalyst for
reform and ultimate abolition of capital punishment in Japan. Any such reform must
therefore begin at a grassroots level upon implementation of the system.
2. Lay Assessor Trials
¶44

In a typical lay assessor trial, six saiban-in will sit on a panel with three judges and
determine both the verdict and sentence in criminal cases. 123 To this end, lay assessors
and judges will make joint decisions in recognizing the facts, applying the laws to those
facts and determining sentences. 124 Decisions of the mixed panel will be made on the
basis of a simple majority, which must include the vote of one judge. 125 Lay assessors are
to be selected by lottery126 from a list of eligible voters in each district 127 and will preside
over all capital trials. 128 In 2004, 3,308 trials would have been eligible for lay
assessment. Notably, prosecutors could have sought capital punishment in up to twothirds of those trials.
Table 3. 2004 Trials Eligible for Lay Assessment (by offence) 129
Offence
Robbery causing bodily injury
Murder
Arson of an inhabited structure
Bodily injury causing death
Robbery and rape causing death
Forcible Indecency resulting in death or injury
Robbery causing death
Robbery and rape
Offences against the Special Drugs Act
Offences against the Stimulant Drug Control Act
Currency forgery
Dangerous driving causing death
Offences against the Possession of Firearms and
Weapons Control Act
Money laundering

Number of Trials
890
795
297
277
270
141
126
105
83
80
79
50
40
24

121

Lay Assessor Act, art. 1, supra note 2, at 236.
The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council - For a
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, June 12, 2001, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html.
123
See id. at art. 2, at 237, art. 6, at 240.
124
See id. at art. 6, at 240-241 (in relation to interpretation of relevant law, lay assessors may comment but
do not have a vote).
125
Id. at art. 66, at 273.
126
Id. at art. 26, at 252.
127
See id. at art. 13, at 243.
128
Id. at art. 2, at 237.
129
Supreme Court of Japan, Zaimei betsu ni mita taisho jikensu (heisei 16 nen) [Number of subject cases
by offence (2005)] (2005) Saiban-in Seido [Lay Assessor System],
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/shiryo/pdf/06.pdf.
122
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Capture and imprisonment resulting in death
Kidnap and ransom
Others
Total

[2007

15
15
21
3,308

3. Qualification of Lay Assessors
¶45

Lay assessors will initially be selected at random from the general public. They
must be eligible to vote; that is, they must be Japanese citizens who are twenty years of
age or more. 130 Certain persons are prohibited or disqualified from service, namely
lawyers, quasi- lawyers and politicians, and persons who have not completed compulsory
education, were subject to imprisonment, or for whom lay assessor duties would be a
burden. 131 Lay assessor candidates may decline service if they are elderly, members of
local councils, students, or have recently served as a lay assessor or on a Prosecutorial
Review Commission. 132
¶46
Lay assessors who have difficulty executing their duties due to illness, carers’
duties, potential damage to business, or attendance at a parent’s funeral or important
social obligation are also excused from service. 133 These allowances for declining service
leave significant leeway for self de-selection by those who oppose the death penalty
and/or do not wish to be involved in sentencing a defendant to death, even as a minority
vote. 134
¶47
Another provision of the Lay Assessor Act pertaining to capital punishment is
Article 18, which grants courts discretion to disqualify lay assessor candidates whom the
court deems may act unfairly in a trial. 135 This provision may effectively eliminate lay
assessor candidates identified as being opposed to the death penalty. Arguably, as long as
the death penalty remains a valid sentence under the Penal Code, an abolitionist lay
assessor is incapable of acting fairly in determinations of whether to sentence a defendant
to death.
4. Dismissal
¶48

The Lay Assessor Act contains a procedure similar to the American voir-dire,
whereby the prosecutor, defendant or defense counsel may invoke a number of grounds
to request dismissal of lay assessors. 136 In particular, a request for dismissal may be
based on “fear that any lay assessors or reserve lay assessors would conduct a trial
unfairly,”137 but only where the causes have already arisen or are learned after the
appointment of the particular lay assessor. Pursuant to this provision, the court is entitled
130

See Anderson & Nolan, supra note 1, at 992.
Lay Assessor Act, art. 14-15, supra note 2, at 243-246.
132
Id. at art. 16, at 246-247
133
See id.
134
See id.
135
Id. at art. 18, at 249.
136
See id. at art. 41, at 260-261 (allowing for dismissal of lay assessors for failure to take the oath, failure
to attend or appear, failure to carry out their obligations, falling under a ground for disqualification, fear
that they would conduct a trial unfairly, false entries on the lay assessor questionnaire, and inappropriate
behavior).
137
Id. at art. 41, at 261.
131
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to conduct a questionnaire of lay assessors before the Lay Assessor Selection
Proceeding138 and to question them at the Proceeding itself. 139 The court may do this to
ascertain whether the person is someone who may conduct the trial unfairly. 140 Given the
open-ended nature of this provision, a lay assessor’s stance on capital punishment could
be the subject of such questioning and prosecutors could seek their dismissal on the basis
of their response. 141
¶49
This criterion therefore leaves the door open for American-style death qualification
by prosecutors in capital cases. In Lockhart v McCree,142 the United States Supreme court
addressed the practice of death qualification in Arkansas courts where jurors decide upon
both the verdict and sentence in capital cases. The trial judge removed eight prospective
jurors on the basis of their statements that they could not vote to impose the death penalty
under any circumstance. The Court upheld the practice as coming within the
“representative cross-section” interpretation of a defendant’s constitutional right to an
impartial jury. 143 The selection of death-qualified jurors has ramifications beyond an
increased likelihood of death sentences, especially in models for lay participation that
involve concomitant deliberation on verdict and sentence, such as the new Japanese lay
assessor system. Specifically, death qualified jurors are more likely to convict and
influence the dynamics of deliberations. 144
¶50
How often and under what circumstances the death-qualification procedure will be
used is unclear. However, the “simple majority plus judge”145 rule for verdict and
sentencing, as opposed to the traditional requirement of unanimity, largely allays the risk
of biased jurors threatening procedural integrity. This safeguard renders the voir dire- like
procedure somewhat superfluous. Furthermore, considering its potential to draw out
proceedings and enlarge workload, prosecutors may be reluctant to request a dismissal.
While worth noting then, the death-qualification system is unlikely to affect criminal
justice rendered in saiban-in courts given that unanimous verdicts are not required.
5. Powers, Duties and Penalties
¶51

In addition to imposing affirmative duties on lay assessors to attend trial, 146
deliberations, 147 and verdict, 148 the Lay Assessor Act also penalizes those who leak
secrets, 149 make fraudulent statements, 150 or fail to appear. 151 In the execution of their
138

Id. at art. 30, at 254-255.
Id. at art. 34, at 256-257.
140
Id. at art. 30, at 254-255.
141
It is also possible that defense lawyers may seek to have jurors removed on the basis of an avowed
propensity to vote for the death penalty in all cases in which it is sought. It is, however, unlikely that such
requests will succeed.
142
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
143
Id. at 173.
144
See generally Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death
Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 1/2 (1984).
145
‘Deliberation, Verdict and Sentencing’, infra Part IV. B(f).
146
Lay Assessor Act, art. 52, supra note 2, at 266.
147
Id. at art. 66, at 273.
148
Id. at art. 63, at 269.
149
Id. at art. 79, at 277.
150
Id. at art. 81, at 279.
139
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duties, lay assessors have the authority to question witnesses, 152 victims 153 and
defendants. 154 In mock lay assessor trials currently being conducted across Japan, lay
assessors prove unhesitant to exercise this authority. 155 The possibility of personal
interaction between lay assessors and defendants, victims and eyewitnesses will bring the
Japanese public closer to criminal trials than they have ever been before. This signals a
shift away from the traditional format for criminal trials in Japan, in which judges had
little room for exploring evidence independent of prosecutorial influence. Both the
Japanese Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Public Prosecutors Office have drafted
reports aimed at minimizing voluminous trial paperwork and introducing a more
interactive, verbal trial to facilitate greater lay involvement. 156 Because lay assessors,
unlike judges, have no legal training and are unaccustomed to the routine of the criminal
justice system, prosecutors will have to work harder to validate their cases through
admitted evidence and live witness testimony, rather than complicated dossiers.
6. Deliberation, Verdict and Sentencing
¶52

Although the Act does not specify that verdict deliberations should take place
before sentencing deliberations, there is speculation among academics studying the new
system that, despite the fact that verdict and sentence will be determined in the single
sitting, verdict deliberations will take place prior to sentencing. In whichever order they
occur, deliberations on one will undoubtedly influence the shape of deliberations on the
other. No specifications for deliberation procedure exist other than that a verdict must be
determined on the basis of a simple majority and that it “shall include both an empanelled
judge and a lay assessor holding that opinion.”157 While relatively simple for deciding
guilt or innocence, this decision formula becomes complicated when applied to
sentencing.
¶53
Given the range of possible sentences for any one crime, sentencing deliberations
will likely yield a confusing range of different opinions as to which sentence is most
appropriate in a particular case; a distinct majority comprising both lay assessors and
judges will be unlikely. In this situation, the law requires:
[T]he number of opinions for the option most unfavourable to the
defendant will be added to the number of opinions for the next favourable
option, until a majority opinion of the members of the judicial panel which
includes both an empanelled judge and a lay assessor holding that opinion
is achieved. 158

151

Id. at art. 83, at 279.
Id. at art. 56, 267.
153
Id. at art. 58, 268.
154
Id. at art. 59, 268.
155
See e.g., Supreme Court of Japan, Summary of Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Matsuyama District
Court Committee (2005) (a report on the mock trials conducted by the Matsuyama District Court, August 34th, 2005) (on file with author).
156
See Yusuke Yoshino & Fumio Tanaka, Cut in Trial Paperwork Eyed, Yomiuri Shimbun, (Apr. 2006) (on
file with author).
157
See Lay Assessor Act, art. 67, supra note 2, at 273-274.
158
Id. at 274.
152
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¶54

The formula is a windfall for de facto abolition. In the likely absence of a majority
opinion for the death penalty in a capital case, the vote of those in favor of the harshest
sentence will be added to those in favor of the second harshest, and so forth, until the
requisite majority is attained. Therefore, votes in favor of the death penalty, if not
constituting the requisite simple majority, will be added to the next harshest penalty and
capital punishment will be eliminated from the equation.
¶55
The requirements that each lay assessor express an opinion at verdict and sentence
deliberations, 159 and that the chief judge sitting on the mixed panel facilitate such
expressions of opinion, 160 further mitigate the likelihood that a suspect will receive the
death penalty. Given its controversial nature and profundity, a decision to condemn a
defendant to death will likely result in a wide spread of opinion in mixed panel
deliberations, and hence, a greater range within which to apply the above-described
formula.
¶56
The success of the lay assessor system will depend upon how the various members
of the saiban-in court play their roles. The following section identifies each of the parties
involved in the new system, their vested interests, and how the overall dynamics among
the parties may produce a shift towards de facto abolition.
V. ABOLITION AND THE SAIBAN-IN SEIDO
A. The Saiban-in Court
¶57

Moving from a closed system in which capital cases were largely dominated by
prosecutors and judges161 to the saiban-in seido will open the Japanese court system to
the closest public scrutiny it has ever had. Beginning in May 2009, with six lay assessors
sitting on mixed panels with three judges, the public will potentially be the most
represented party in the courtroom. This revolutionary change in dynamics between the
parties will largely dictate the outcomes of the system and thus the potential for de facto
abolition. This section examines the varying perspectives and expectations of
prosecutors, judges, defendants and defense lawyers, and future lay assessors regarding
the saiban-in seido.
1. Prosecutors

¶58

As long as the death penalty remains a valid form of punishment, prosecutors have
the duty to charge and pursue the sentence in applicable cases. Regardless of the
introduction of the lay assessor system then, prosecutors are first and foremost interested
in obtaining a conviction and death sentence in every case for which they seek it. Once
the lay assessor system commences, prosecutors will face difficulties in successfully
pursuing these interests.
¶59
The predictability of the system up until now means that a prosecutor often brings
charges in accordance with what he expects the outcome to be in a case. 162 Scholars have
159
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argued that this is one principal reason for Japan’s extraordinarily high conviction rate. 163
The unpredictability associated with lay involvement in the system carries with it the
potential for prosecutors to lose their power to anticipate outcomes. Given that acquittals
are regarded as a threat to prosecutors’ legitimacy, 164 the introduction of lay participation
may lead prosecutors to bring more moderate charges and fewer capital cases than
previously.
¶60
Versed and rehearsed in a largely inquisitorial system involving little oral evidence
or cross-examination at trial phase, prosecutors working with the lay assessor system will
need to focus on developing advocacy skills that are appropriate in a much less formal,
adversarial proceeding. In preparation for this new role, prosecutors are undergoing
training both in Japan and abroad to become educated in the art of trial advocacy. 165
¶61
The Supreme Court Pub lic Prosecutors Office has finalized a draft report proposing
a reduction in trial documentation to better facilitate the introduction of the new
system. 166 Still, the report falls short of abolishing the system of written records of
investigators’ questioning of defendants. Thus, courts may continue to rely on written
confessions in determining guilt or innocence. In failing to exclude such written
confessions, prosecutors reveal their intent for lay assessors to also rely on written
confessions obtained during initial investigation rather than verbal statements given by
defendants in court. 167 However, the Minister of Justice indicated in recent statements
that even this shady area of Japanese criminal procedure will soon become more
transparent as prosecutors prepare to make audio and video recordings of suspect
interrogations on a trial basis. 168 Although the Public Prosecutors Office states that not
every stage of the interrogation process would be recorded, this change in documentation
demonstrates willingness on the part of the procuracy to increase transparency, give
greater credibility to evidence of confessions, and facilitate more easily understandable
trials in anticipation of lay involvement.
2. Judges
¶62

Judges face the same dilemma as prosecutors in interacting with members of the
public, but to a much greater extent. First, where a prosecutor must persuade, a judge
must cooperate with other judges and lay assessors during verdict and sentence
deliberations. In the lay assessor system, judges—noted for their conservatism and
reputation for being out-of-touch with society169 —may no longer maintain an arms-length
relation to jurors. Instead, they must aim to explain the relevant laws in a more easily
understandable fashion and facilitate the participation of each lay assessor. 170
163
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Accordingly, they must exhibit a degree of empathy and patience, a much greater change
in conduct than for prosecutors.
¶63
Second, the saiban-in-seido will pose new ethical challenges to judges in light of
the significant amount of discretionary power that the Lay Assessor Act grants the
judiciary. For example, judges will have power, directly or at counsel’s request, to
dismiss lay assessors on the basis of a belief that they will act unfairly. 171 An even more
important ethical challenge, though the Act does not consider it, is that judges may have
to exercise personal discretion to avoid unduly influencing lay assessors during
deliberations, since judges are predisposed to relying on confessions and entering
judgments imposing the death penalty. 172 It is of significant concern that, because the
content and procedure of deliberations are to be kept secret, 173 the degree of judicial
influence on the outcomes of lay assessor trials will not be ascertainable. The judiciary
is, however, taking measures in the lead-up to the system’s introduction to make
participation as accessible and worthwhile as possible for future lay assessors.
¶64
Some of the suggested improvements may indirectly pave the way for de facto
abolition, and to some extent alleviate fears of undue judicial influence in deliberations
mentioned above. For example, in contrast to the draft report of the Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office, 174 a Supreme Court draft report published in November 2004
emphasized the importance of relying principally on oral submissions during trial and
considering written statements from pre-trial proceedings only when necessary for
clarification purposes. 175 In formulating this proposal, the Supreme Court considered the
risk that professional judges, who are accustomed to dealing with such written
statements, will instruct lay assessors on how to decide whether a particular defendant is
guilty. 176
3. Defendants and Defense Lawyers
¶65

Defendants and defense lawyers have the greatest interest in seeing the new system
pave the way for de facto and eventual de jure abolition of the death penalty. Certain
obstacles, however, may impede progress toward those goals. First, defense lawyers are
as disadvantaged as prosecutors in terms of a lack of advocacy experience and training.
Their access to the same or similar training schemes as Japanese prosecutors will
determine how level the playing field will be post- introduction of the system. If the
JFBA and the defense counsel committees of its regional counterparts (keiji bengo iinkai)
cannot prepare defense lawyers for their new roles in the same way that the Supreme
Public Prosecutors Office and Ministry of Justice are doing for prosecutors, the
introduction of the lay assessor system could prove very detrimental to the defense.
¶66
Second, depending on the prosecution’s use of the so-called voir dire procedure,
defense lawyers will need to learn to play the game of jury stacking to their benefit.
However, recent trends towards both recording pre-trial interrogations and reducing
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reliance on written confessions give hope to defendants and defense lawyers whose
clients face the ultimate penalty.
4. Lay Assessors
¶67

Surveys and forums held prior to and after the enactment of the Lay Assessor Act
reveal a general reluctance among the Japanese public to participate as a lay assessor. 177
This reluctance appears to stem not only from a desire to avoid disruption to daily life
and business, but also from a general feeling that it lacks the education and qualifications
necessary to fulfil the role. 178 Another reason for this reluctance is the public’s hesitance
to be directly involved in harsh sentencing. 179 During the question and answer session of
a Ministry of Justice-sponsored forum on the introduction of the saiban-in seido,
members of the public voiced a reluctance to vote for the death penalty even in the most
heinous crimes. 180 Satoru Shinomiya, a lawyer presiding over the “Town Meeting in
Kanazawa,” responded by stating that the new lay assessor system would provide a good
opportunity for those Japanese people who previously supported capital punishment, but
left its administration to lawyers and the government, to review their stance and
reconsider the issue. He concluded with the hope that public debate on capital
punishment would further deepen as a result of the public’s newly imposed obligation to
grapple with the issue. 181
B. The Potential Outcomes

¶68

Although the drafting of the Lay Assessor Act expressly excluded abolition of
capital punishment as a reason for reform, each party in the ne w saiban-in court since
then has appeared to directly or indirectly contemplate the prospect of de facto abolition
of the death penalty. At least three avenues for de facto abolition exist, though the
possible outcomes of the new lay assessor system are multitudinous. The first scenario
may happen where prosecutors seek the death penalty and it is outvoted in accordance
with the simple majority formula. The second may occur when prosecutors seek the
death penalty and it is outvoted upon applying the complex sentence reduction formula,
despite some members of the mixed panel voting for it. Finally, prosecutors may very
well not seek the death penalty in some cases, due to the unpredictability of success, and
instead seek a lesser penalty for which they ha ve greater chances of success.
¶69
Of course much will depend upon the interaction among each of the parties
involved. However, procedural changes in place and under consideration that are aimed
at facilitating the saiban-in seido indicate positive first steps towards achieving some
form of abolition.
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VI. CONCLUSION

¶70

Japan, like any other democracy, grounds its national policies in the will of its
people. This is especially so in the case for retention of the death penalty. With de jure
abolition of the death pena lty close to becoming a norm of customary international law,
and absent affirmative steps by the Japanese ministry, judiciary or procuracy towards
abolition, the task will fall to the people to effect the change necessary to bring Japan in
line with its international legal obligations and to set an example in Asia.
¶71
The introduction of the lay assessor system in May 2009 will place Japan’s system
of capital punishment squarely within the public domain and provide the Japanese public
with the tools to initiate a change towards de jure abolition. For the first time, the
Japanese people will make decisions on capital sentencing, which may play an essential
role in abolition at a grassroots level. Many factors will influence the decisions of lay
assessors, not the least of which are the roles played by the prosecutors, judges,
defendants and defense lawyers in the new system. Each of these members of the future
saiban-in courtroom is surely anxious about how the introduction of the new system will
affect their interests. However, attempts already made and currently under consideration
to make the system more transparent, accessible and efficient suggest that any change
will be positive for the criminal justice system overall.
¶72
From the perspective that de jure abolition of Japan’s system of capital punishment
is desirable if not imperative, the saiban-in seido may well prove to be the necessary first
step towards that end. Allowing the people to decide may turn out to be the necessary
catalyst for a shift in conscience away from support of capital punishment. Although the
Japanese government ultimately will decide whether to pass legislation abolishing the
death penalty once and for all, the decisions that the Japanese people make as participants
in the saiban-in seido will surely inform that decisio n.
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